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DONALD H. REGAN Against Evaluator Relativity: 
A Response to Sen 
In a recent essay in this journal Amartya Sen introduced the notion of 
an evaluator-relative consequence-based morality. I The basic idea can be 
described very simply. A consequence-based morality is a morality that 
instructs each agent to maximize some objective function defined over 
states of affairs. Such a morality is evaluator neutral if it assigns to every 
agent the same objective function. If different agents have different ob- 
jective functions, then the morality is evaluator relative. For example, a 
morality would be evaluator relative if it assigned to Jones an objective 
function giving greater weight to the welfare of Jones's children than 
Smith's children, while it assigned to Smith an objective function giving 
greater weight to the welfare of Smith's children than Jones's. In more 
traditional anguage, a morality is consequence-based if it says that right 
acts are acts which have good consequences. A consequence-based mo- 
rality is evaluator neutral if there is a universal good that all agents are 
required to promote; it is evaluator relative if different agents are assigned 
different goods. This brief description conceals some complications and 
possible sources of confusion, but it is not intended as a summary of or 
a replacement for Sen's very illuminating general discussion of agent 
relativity. Sen has shown that evaluator relativity must always be accom- 
panied by some other form of relativity, but my focus will be on evaluator 
relativity except where I advert specifically to another form. 
Sen notes that proponents of consequence-based moralities have gen- 
erally defended evaluator-neutral forms. He does not actually recommend 
the adoption of an evaluator-relative theory. Still, he discusses the pos- 
sibilities of evaluator relativity with such interest and apparent favor that 
it seems worth pursuing the investigation of evaluator relativity a bit 
i. Amartya Sen, "Rights and Agency," Philosophy & Public Affairs iI, no. I (Winter 
I982): 3-39. 
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further and, in the process, pointing out some reasons why neither people 
inclined to accept consequence-based theories (on whom I shall concen- 
trate) nor people with deontological inclinations should leap to embrace 
Sen's new idea. 
There is one traditional view that can be construed as recommending 
a specific evaluator-relative consequence-based morality-ethical egoism. 
The central Section of this essay, Section III, partially vindicates G. E. 
Moore's famous refutation of egoism.2 Moore claimed that the egoist must 
contradict himself. Bernard Williams denies this.3 On the issue as stated, 
Moore is wrong and Williams right. But Moore was a consequentialist, 
and egoism is often presented as a consequentialist theory. What Moore 
should have said, and what he may well have had in mind, is that the 
egoist cannot fit his theory into the consequentialist mold without con- 
tradicting himself. That is what I shall show, in a more general form, in 
Section III. The claim is more perspicuous if turned around: An evaluator- 
relative consequence-based theory can be formulated without contradic- 
tion, but it turns out that in such a theory the evaluations of consequences 
do not really account for the judgments about the rightness of acts. 
I 
Let us put aside at the start a specious criticism of evaluator relativity. 
It might seem that evaluator-relative theories violate the requirement of 
universalizability. This need not be so. 
The appearance of nonuniversalizability arises because, on an evalu- 
ator-relative theory, it may be the case that Jones is required to do some 
act while Smith, who has a different evaluative point of view, would be 
required in the very same circumstances to do something different. Sup- 
pose, as in the example above, that each agent is required to give special 
weight to the welfare of his own child. Jones, if he must choose between 
helping his son Tommy and Smith's son John, should help Tommy. 
Smith, faced with the identical choice, should help John. 
2. G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, I962), pp. 
98-99. An argument similar to Moore's may be found in Brian Medlin, "Ultimate Principles 
and Ethical Egoism," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 35 (I957), pp. i i i-i8, reprinted 
in Morality and Rational Self-Interest, ed. David Gauthier (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice- 
Hall, I970), pp. 56-63. 
3. Bernard Williams, "Egoism and Altruism," in Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cam- 
bridge University Press, 1973), p. 258. 
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In this case, the solution is obvious. If we describe the alternatives as 
"help Tommy" and "help John," then Jones and Smith must do different 
things. However, if we describe the alternatives as "help your own child" 
and "help the other," then each is required to do the same thing, namely 
to help his own. There is room for argument between the "neutralist" 
and the "relativist" about which form of description is more appropriate, 
but universalizability is at best a somewhat impressionistic notion, and 
the agent-relative descriptions are sufficiently natural so that the neu- 
tralist cannot rule them out of court on universalizability grounds. 
On the other hand, nothing in Sen's formalism guarantees that rede- 
scription will always be adequate to save universalizability. Imagine, for 
example, an evaluator-relative theory which requires Jones to place a 
high value on the preservation of wilderness and requires Smith to ignore 
wilderness preservation but to place a high value on energy-intensive 
activities. There will be cases involving conflicts between these values 
where Jones and Smith will be required to do different things in identical 
circumstances. Nothing we have said entails that there need be any 
natural way of redescribing the alternatives so that Jones and Smith must 
really do the "same" thing. So far as the formalism of evaluator relativity 
goes, there need be nothing about Jones and Smith that explains why 
they are assigned different evaluative points of view. The assignments 
may be completely arbitrary. If they are arbitrary, the theory will not be 
universalizable. 
It might be said that, despite the generality of the formalism, no pro- 
ponent of evaluator relativity would ever defend a theory in which the 
evaluative points of view were assigned arbitrarily. There would always 
be some explanation of why particular evaluations were appropriate for 
particular individuals. Sen suggests something like this when he observes 
that, "If evaluator relativity is derived from the 'positional interpretation', 
then it is really position relativity that is admitted, which entails evaluator 
relativity only to the extent that evaluators differ from each other in their 
respective positions. "4 It is reasonable to assume that the relevant dif- 
ferences in respective positions will always be such as to suggest natural 
agent-relative descriptions of the acts under consideration, in terms of 
which we can see that the theory is universalizable. 
Let me simply state the conclusions which a fuller discussion would 
4. Sen, "Rights and Agency," p. 36. 
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lead to. Universalizability does not exclude evaluator relativity, or doer 
relativity, or self-evaluation relativity. These relativities are defined by 
Sen on the assumption that acts are described in neutral terms ("help 
Tommy" as opposed to "help your own son"); indeed, they could not be 
brought out otherwise. All that universalizability requires is that these 
relativities (and any others we might suggest) disappear when we re- 
describe acts in certain natural ways. Universalizability does eliminate 
instances of arbitrary relativity, as we have seen. It is not an empty 
requirement. Still, it allows relativities of all of Sen's types. 
II 
Sen is aware that talk of "evaluator relativity" is going to make people 
uneasy. There is no question about the logical coherence of a theory 
which instructs different agents to maximize different objective func- 
tions; and, as we have seen, it cannot be argued that such a theory must 
fail to be universalizable. Still, is it appropriate to say such a theory 
instructs agents to maximize the goodness of the consequences of their 
acts? Since evaluation is relative, each agent must be viewed as maxi- 
mizing something like "the good from his point of view." Does that really 
make sense? 
There are, of course, perfectly ordinary senses of "good from his point 
of view." If Jones's hated uncle, on the verge of discovering a cure for 
Alzheimer's Disease, dies instead, leaving Jones a fortune, we might say 
that was good from Jones's point of view but not from the point of view 
of the rest of the world. But in saying this occurrence was good from 
Jones's point of view, we would simply be saying it promoted Jones's 
interests. We would not be saying it was, for lack of a better phrase, 
morally good from Jones's point of view. When I say "morally good" here, 
I obviously do not mean "good in virtue of some specifically moral property 
such as, for example, righteousness." I mean rather something like "de- 
serving of approval upon dispassionate consideration in a distinctive 'moral' 
frame of mind." The question is whether it makes sense to think of 
"morally good" (hereafter just "good") in this sense as being subject to 
modification by different points of view. 
Sen's case for the relevance of points of view depends heavily on an 
aesthetic analogy.5 Sen observes that we can say "Mt. Everest is beautiful 
5. Ibid., pp. 35-38. 
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from five miles to the south" and also "Mt. Everest is not beautiful from 
five miles to the east" without in any way contradicting ourselves. Fur- 
thermore, both claims may be completely objective. Aesthetic evaluation 
depends on one's point of view. I have no disagreement with what Sen 
says about Mt. Everest. However, the analogy to moral evaluation is 
unpersuasive. 
When I say, "Mt. Everest is beautiful from five miles to the south," 
what I am saying is that Mt. Everest looks beautiful from there. I am 
saying something about the way Mt. Everest looks, or about its appear- 
ance. That I am talking about the way it looks, or about its appearance, 
should not be taken to suggest that I am talking about an illusion or an 
illusory appearance. What I am talking about is perfectly real. It is the 
way Everest really looks from that spot. Indeed, it is precisely the reality 
of "the way Everest looks" that makes it easy to understand and to explain 
why Everest looks different from different places. The pattern of light, 
described in terms of color and intensity, that reaches my eye as I look 
at Everest from the south is entirely different from the pattern of light 
that reaches my eye as I look at Everest from the east. I do not of course 
mean to identify "the way Everest looks from five miles to the south" 
with any pattern of light. But differences in the relevant patterns of light 
fully explain why Everest looks different from different vantage points. 
Compare now the situation where Jones's son has just broken his leg. 
Jones says, "His breaking his leg was a terrible thing." Smith says, "Well, 
of course it's a shame for anyone to break a bone, but it's not really so 
bad as Jones makes out." We can easily imagine Jones and Smith making 
these disparate observations. The question is, Can they both be right? If 
we doubt that they can both be right, does the Mt. Everest analogy help 
us to see how they both can be? I think not. The problem is that here 
there is nothing at all that corresponds to the perfectly obvious expla- 
nation of how the two judgments of Everest can both be right. There are 
not two obviously different patterns of "moral light." 
We can do more to emphasize the disanalogy. When I say, "Mt. Everest 
is beautiful from five miles to the south," we have no difficulty distin- 
guishing between "the way Everest looks from five miles to the south" 
and my aesthetic judgment on the way Everest looks from there. In the 
case of Tommy's broken leg, however, we cannot distinguish between 
"the way it looks from Jones's moral position" and some further moral 
judgment on the way it looks. The "way it looks" from Jones's moral 
position is the moral judgment from that position. (Sen might suggest 
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that what Jones "sees" prior to any moral judgment, is "the evaluator's 
son's broken leg," whereas what Smith sees, prior to any moral judgment, 
is "somebody else's son's broken leg." But Jones and Smith are still seeing 
the same broken leg under different descriptions. "The way Everest looks 
from five miles to the south" and "the way Everest looks from five miles 
to the east" are emphatically not one thing differently described.) In the 
Everest case, then, there is a difference in what is seen that precedes 
and explains the difference in judgments; in the moral case, there is not. 
Can it be made to appear that Jones and Smith "see" different things, 
or that they are talking about different states of affairs that correspond 
to different patterns of light? The only obvious way to argue that Jones 
and Smith are evaluating different things (and not the same thing under 
different descriptions) is to imagine that Jones is evaluating the conse- 
quences of Tommy's broken leg for Jones's relationship to Tommy and 
the world, while Smith is evaluating the consequences of the same broken 
leg for Smith's relationship to Tommy and the world. But then Sen's 
claim that there are different evaluative points of view would be tied to 
a claim that what we are really required to value is always aspects of our 
own relationships. I do not say that Sen would be committed to the claim 
that we are or should be selfish in any narrow sense. Jones might love 
his son and be to all external appearances an ideal parent. But it would 
still have to be the case that Jones loved him essentially as "my son," 
and not as "Tommy." That would be unacceptable, as I assume Sen would 
agree. 
I take it Sen would say, "No, no. Jones and Smith are both talking 
about the same thing, Tommy's broken leg, but they have different moral 
relationships to it, just as the person five miles to the south and the 
person five miles to the east are both talking about Everest but have 
different physical relationships to it." The trouble is that I know exactly 
how the different physical relationships to Everest lead to different aes- 
thetic judgments, and the process suggests no moral analogue, even 
when I am reminded that Jones is Tommy's father and Smith is not. The 
closest I can come to understanding the idea that Tommy's broken leg 
is worse from Jones's point of view than from Smith's is understanding 
the idea that Jones ought to care more about Tommy's broken leg than 
Smith does. But that seems a rather different idea, and I shall not pursue 
it here. 
I have not shown by positive argument that the notion of "good from 
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a point of view" is incoherent. Nor shall I. In the next Section I shall 
show that the notion of "good from a point of view," even if it is coherent, 
cannot be satisfactorily combined with the ruling idea of traditional con- 
sequentialism, which is that our judgments about the rightness of acts 
should be explained by our judgments about the goodness of conse- 
quences. In the Section after next I shall show that if we nevertheless 
adopt an evaluator-relative theory, our doing so will have some undesir- 
able results in practice. 
III 
The central idea of traditional consequentialism is that we should be able 
to account for our judgments about the rightness of acts in terms of our 
judgments about the goodness of states of affairs. In this Section I shall 
consider three ways of interpreting Sen's suggestion that there are dif- 
ferent, equally objective, points of view from which judgments of good- 
ness can be made, and I shall show that on none of the three interpre- 
tations can we in fact account for our judgments of rightness in terms 
of our judgments of goodness. Perhaps it is worth saying at the outset 
that although I discuss three interpretations of Sen, I think it is tolerably 
clear which interpretation Sen prefers. It is the last of the three, in the 
order of my treatment. To some readers it will be obvious from the start 
that my first two interpretations are not what Sen intends. Of such readers 
I ask patience. It will not be immediately obvious to everyone that the 
first two interpretations are wrong; and even for the most perspicacious 
readers there may be some benefit in explicitly contrasting the third 
interpretation with the other two possibilities. 
A 
On the first interpretation, if some state of affairs is good from Jones's 
point of view, that fact licenses Jones (though not anyone else) to assert 
simply, "That state of affairs is good," and to mean thereby something 
which does not bear any essential stamp of relativization to a point of 
view. 
On this interpretation, Jones will sometimes have occasion to say, cor- 
rectly, "Smith acted rightly, but he certainly didn't produce the best 
possible consequences." To be sure, Jones will be justified in saying Smith 
didn't produce the best possible consequences by the fact that the con- 
This content downloaded from 141.211.57.224 on Wed, 14 Jan 2015 13:16:45 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
I 00 Philosophy & Public Affairs 
sequences were not the best possible from his, Jones's, point of view. But 
that is, for Jones, the correct point of view when he is judging, not the 
rightness of Smith's act, but the value of the consequences Smith pro- 
duces. In order to be able to assert "Smith acted rightly but failed to 
produce the best possible consequences," and in particular in order to be 
able to assert "Smith acted rightly," Jones must be able to assume Smith's 
point of view hypothetically. He must be able to make the judgment that, 
"From Smith's point of view, such and such consequences are best." Still, 
when it comes to judging the consequences themselves, independently 
of the question of what Smith ought to have done, it is Jones's own 
evaluative point of view that Jones is called upon to occupy. So when he 
says, "Smith acted rightly but produced inferior consequences," he is 
neither being wilfully paradoxical nor falling into some avoidable con- 
fusion. 
It is tempting to try to eliminate Jones's paradoxical assertion by saying 
that Jones should appeal to his own evaluative point of view only when 
evaluating the consequences of his own acts. When he is evaluating the 
consequences of Smith's acts, he should take Smith's point of view; and 
so on. This will not do. The same state of affairs may be both a conse- 
quence of an act by Jones and a consequence of an act by Smith. (This 
may be true if Jones influences Smith, or if Jones and Smith act inde- 
pendently but their acts produce some joint effect.) In such a case, if 
Jones is required to take one point of view on the consequences of his 
own acts and another point of view on the consequences of Smith's acts, 
he may well find himself required to make incompatible evaluations of 
the same state of affairs. 
If we cannot eliminate the paradox involved in Jones's assertion that 
Smith has acted rightly but produced inferior consequences, is this one 
of those paradoxes we must just learn to live with? No, I don't think we 
can live with it. Suppose Jones asks himself why Smith's act was right 
despite having inferior consequences. He can repeat to himself what he 
has already explicitly or implicitly noted, that the act had best conse- 
quences from Smith's point of view. But, from Jones's point of view, 
Smith's point of view is mistaken. Smith's evaluation of the consequences, 
considered not as a step in Smith's deciding what to do but as an eval- 
uation of the consequences, is just wrong (Jones must believe). Smith's 
mistaken evaluation may explain why Smith thinks the act is right; and 
it might lead Jones to regard Smith as excused for acting wrongly. But 
Jones cannot explain his own view that Smith's act was right by relying 
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substantively on an evaluation he rejects. (Jones might try to sidestep 
this difficulty by saying that Smith's act was right because it produced 
"good consequences" in the sense of "the consequences Smith was sup- 
posed to produce." But that would be to admit openly that the notion of 
goodness was playing no genuine role in the justification of the claim 
that Smith acted rightly.) In sum, on the present interpretation of eval- 
uator relativity, Jones's judgments of goodness cannot explain his judg- 
ments of rightness. 
B 
At more than one point in the preceding subsection, it would have been 
natural to suggest a new interpretation of evaluator relativity. Perhaps 
Jones's point of view should be limited, not to the evaluation of the con- 
sequences of Jones's acts (we have considered and rejected that possi- 
bility), but rather to the evaluation of states of affairs considered as con- 
sequences of Jones's acts. Some state of affairs may be both a consequence 
of an act of Jones and a consequence of an act of Smith; but even so, 
we can distinguish between considering it as a consequence of an act of 
Jones (in the course of deciding what Jones should do or should have 
done) and considering it as a consequence of an act of Smith (in the 
course of deciding what Smith should do or should have done). 
Now, if Jones's point of view is relevant only to evaluating states of 
affairs considered as consequences of Jones's acts-if even Jones must 
not regard evaluations "from his point of view" as having any broader 
significance-then the notion of goodness functions only inside the con- 
text of choosing and judging acts. To say that the consequences of some 
act are "good from Jones's point of view" is to say only that they are the 
consequences Jones is required to produce. (In effect, we have redupli- 
cated the suggestion at the end of the preceding subsection that Jones 
might say of Smith's act that it produced "good consequences" in the 
sense of "the consequences Smith is supposed to produce.") To say "these 
are the consequences Jones is required to produce" is not to give even 
the semblance of a reason, from Jones's point of view or any other, for 
such a requirement. In sum, on the present interpretation of evaluator 
relativity, the judgment that an act has good consequences from Jones's 
point of view, while it may still entail that the act is right for Jones, has 
no tendency at all to explain its rightness. 
The point here, while essentially simple, is easy to lose hold of. Let me 
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try to forestall two possible confusions. First, I would admit that the claim 
"the act has good consequences from Jones's point of view" might be 
thought to explain the rightness of the act to the extent that it calls 
attention to the fact that the consequences of the act are rated higher by 
the objective function assigned to Jones than are the consequences of 
any other available act. The important point, however, is that the refer- 
ence to "goodness," as it is presently being construed, cannot possibly 
function as a reason why Jones should have that objective function. 
Second, the point is not just that the present claim about "goodness" 
gives no reason why Jones should have that objective function, as opposed 
to someone else. The point is that it gives no reason for assigning that 
objective function to anyone at all, Jones included. It gives no reason 
why the assigned "objective" should be an objective, for anyone. 
C 
We need a new interpretation of evaluator relativity, and we need judg- 
ments of goodness-from-a-point-of-view to have two properties if they are 
to explain the judgments of rightness we want them to explain: On the 
one hand, they must be free-standing, in the sense that they must have 
significance beyond the immediate context of choosing and judging acts. 
That is what we learned from subsection B. On the other hand, what we 
learned from subsection A is that judgments of goodness-from-a-point 
of-view must be essentially and ineradicably relative. It must not follow 
from the statement, "That state of affairs is good from Jones's point of 
view," that even Jones can assert simply, "That state of affairs is good." 
He may utter the sentence, "That state of affairs is good," but we must 
always understand an implicit reference to his point of view, not merely 
as part of his justification for what he says, but as part of what he means 
by what he says. 
We have, of course, a model for just the sort of judgments we want- 
it is the judgments from different physical points of view in Sen's Everest 
example. The judgments of beauty-from-a-point-of-view are free-stand- 
ing. But they are also essentially relative to a point of view. The Everest 
analogy is excellent for showing what judgments of goodness-from-a- 
point-of-view must be like if they are to serve Sen's purposes, even though 
it does little, if I am right, to show that judgments of goodness-from-a- 
point-of-view can be like this. 
Suppose I now concede the possibility of judgments of goodness-from- 
This content downloaded from 141.211.57.224 on Wed, 14 Jan 2015 13:16:45 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
103 Against Evaluator Relativity 
a-point-of-view on the Everest model. There is still a difficulty. Assume 
Jones has just done an act whose consequences were good from his own 
point of view but bad from Smith's. I ask Jones, "Why did you do that 
act?" He responds, "Because it had good consequences." 
"Good consequences from your point of view, you mean?" 
"Of course." 
"You are aware the act had bad consequences from Smith's point of 
view?" 
"Yes." 
"Well then, why did you act to produce good consequences from your 
point of view instead of good consequences from Smith's point of view? 
That is, in choosing a point of view for evaluating the consequences of 
your act, why did you choose Jones's instead of Smith's?" 
"Because the point of view you mincingly refer to as 'Jones's' is mine!" 
"I don't think that's an answer. In a different context, of course, it 
would be. If by 'a judgment from your point of view' we meant something 
like 'a judgment embodying the belief it was most reasonable for you to 
have about the truth of some matter', then it would obviously be true in 
an important sense that you should act on your point of view. But on the 
present interpretation that is not what we mean by 'a judgment from 
your point of view'. Given what we do mean, I don't think it's at all obvious 
you should act on judgments of good from your point of view as opposed 
to Smith's or anyone else's. So I ask again, why did you act on your point 
of view?" 
At this point Jones might say, "Because that's what I am supposed to 
do. The theory says each agent should maximize the good-from-his-point- 
of-view." If Jones says this, then he in effect concedes the point I am 
trying to make, which is that even on the present interpretation of eval- 
uator relativity, our judgments of goodness do not account for our judg- 
ments of rightness. To be sure, theyfigure in an account of our judgments 
of rightness. But they do not account for them without leaving a very 
important gap. They give no explanation of why each agent should max- 
imize the good from one point of view as opposed to another. 
It might seem that there is an obvious answer to my criticism-it might 
seem that of course each agent should maximize the good as it appears 
from the position he occupies. To see why this answer is inadequate, we 
must expand on an exchange in my dialogue with Jones, and we must 
distinguish between "evaluatively occupying" a position and "empirically 
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occupying" it. I shall say that Jones "evaluatively occupies" a position if 
in his role as an evaluator he must give that position special prominence. 
Now, as we normally use the phrase "Jones's point of view," it is clear 
that Jones does evaluatively occupy his own point of view. We can talk 
of Jones's point of view even on a neutral good, and we mean something 
like Jones's best judgment of what that good is. It is clear that when 
Jones is called upon to make specific evaluations, he has no alternative 
but to give his own point of view in this sense special prominence. On 
the other hand, if we are dealing with an evaluator-relative theory and 
different points of view on the good in Sen's sense, it turns out that Jones 
does not evaluatively occupy his "own" point of view. Recall that all 
evaluations, even those made by Jones from his "own" point of view, are 
essentially relative. When Jones says, "Tommy's broken leg is a terrible 
thing," what he means is "From the point of view of someone who happens 
to be Tommy's father, Tommy's broken leg is a terrible thing." So far as 
the evaluative content of the judgment is concerned there is no more to 
it than that. But of course JQnes can also say, with perfect truth, "From 
the point of view of someone who happens not to be Tommy's father, the 
broken leg is not so bad after all." Since every evaluative judgment Jones 
makes is essentially relativized to some point of view or other, there is 
nothing in Jones's evaluations to connect him to one point of view rather 
than another. In sum, Jones does not evaluatively occupy "Jones's" point 
of view. To be sure, Jones empirically occupies Jones's point of view. 
What we have been calling "Jones's point of view" is the point of view 
of Tommy's father, and Jones is Tommy's father. (Indeed, in whatever 
sense it is a necessary truth that I was born in my birthplace it is a 
necessary truth that Jones empirically occupies Jones's point of view.) 
Still, I see no reason why, in selecting an evaluative viewpoint as a basis 
for action, Jones should select the viewpoint from the position he occupies 
empirically even though he does not occupy it evaluatively. Perhaps he 
should. But to say that he should because that is the position he occupies 
is to say very much less than one might have supposed. 
If we look again at the Everest example, with this difficulty in mind, 
we will discover a new disanalogy between the aesthetic case and the 
moral. If Jones and Smith are viewing Everest from different locations, 
and if we ask Jones, "Is it better that Everest should be beautiful from 
where you are than from where Smith is?", he would presumably say no. 
This content downloaded from 141.211.57.224 on Wed, 14 Jan 2015 13:16:45 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
I05 Against Evaluator Relativity 
He might add that he likes it better when Everest is beautiful from where 
he is, but that is another matter. On the other hand, suppose we ask 
Jones whether it is better that the state of the world should be good from 
his own point of view than from Smith's. What should he say? If he is 
cautious, he will say no; or perhaps, "That's a meaningless question; 
there is no nonrelative 'better' "; or even, "Yes-from my point of view, 
of course." But when Jones acts, he attempts to bring it about that the 
state of the world is the best possible from his point of view. It seems 
that by his action he is saying implicitly that it is better for the world to 
be good from his point of view than for it to be good from Smith's point 
of view. (Maybe not. Maybe he is only saying implicitly that he ought to 
try to maximize the goodness of the world from his point of view. But 
then we repeat, "Why, given that there are other points of view with 
precisely equal credentials?") The point is that action necessarily involves 
preferring one point of view to others in a way that aesthetic judgment 
does not. 
To summarize the results of this Section, we have seen that however 
we interpret evaluator relativity, the proponent of an evaluator-relative 
theory is unable to account for his judgments of rightness in terms of 
his judgments of goodness. On the first interpretation, judgments of 
rightness and judgments of goodness are in open conflict. On the second 
interpretation, judgments of goodness are too insubstantial to account 
for anything. On the third interpretation, which is the most nearly ade- 
quate, there is a crucial unanswered question-why should each agent 
act on his own point of view instead of some other? 
I am confident that Sen intends the third interpretation, and I admit 
that my argument against the third interpretation is weaker than my 
arguments against the other two. It might even seem that I am begging 
the question in favor of evaluator neutrality and against evaluator rela- 
tivity (under the third interpretation) by assuming an unreasonably strong 
sense in which judgments of goodness must "account for" judgments of 
rightness. It is not always easy to tell when a philosophical argument is 
question-begging, but I think this one is not. Plainly, on an evaluator- 
neutral theory our judgments of goodness account for our judgments of 
rightness more completely than on an evaluator-relative theory. The ques- 
tion of which point of view an agent should act on does not arise. Perhaps 
we should not insist on that extra degree of completeness. But that there 
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is a difference here, on a matter which has been central to the historical 
intentions of consequentialists, cannot be denied.6 
IV 
Suppose that, undeterred by the argument of the previous Section, we 
embraced an evaluator-relative theory. There would be some unfortunate 
results which flow from the fact that the evaluator-relative theory, while 
it abandons neutrality, retains another feature of traditional consequen- 
tialism, what we might call its "compulsoriness." 
To both oversimplify and speak metaphorically, moral theories tend to 
come in two kinds. One kind of theory, based on rights and duties, is 
primarily concerned to carve out for each agent a bit of room for action, 
a private space, within which he can do as he likes so long as he does 
not overstep the bounds and invade the space of others. The other kind 
of theory, based on some conception of the good, is primarily concerned 
to tell each agent what all his actions should aim at. Good-based theories 
leave much less room for unconstrained choice. They are much more 
"compulsory." 
A theory of the first kind, concerned with giving agents room for action, 
can admit that within their private spheres agents may have different, 
even conflicting projects. Different "points of view" are perfectly ac- 
ceptable. On the other hand, it remains open to the proponent of such a 
theory to regard as ideal a situation in which conflict disappears and all 
projects are in common. (What disappears is not conflict among values, 
but conflict among agents in their pursuit of values.) 
Absence of conflict is a powerful and appealing ideal. It is accorded 
the status of a requirement, and not just an ideal, by an evaluator-neutral 
consequentialism. But it cannot be taken even as an ideal by an evaluator- 
relative theory like Sen's. Sen combines the compulsoriness of conse- 
quentialism with divergent assigned points of view, and the result is that 
harmony among agents' projects is positively excluded. Harmony would 
6. Sen's notion of evaluator relativity has something in common with Jesse Kalin's sug- 
gestion that "A moral theory may be teleological in terms of merely formal values" ("In 
Defense of Egoism," in Morality and Rational Self-Interest, ed. David Gauthier [Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970], p. 78). Kalin's idea is not exactly the same as Sen's, but 
the argument I give in the text could be used to show that a theory recognizing only what 
Kalin calls "formal values" cannot be teleological in the traditional sense. 
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remain empirically possible if the assigned points of view were sufficiently 
empty-if, say, they assigned to each agent the task of satisfying his own 
desires. But what purports to be a point of view on the good ought to 
have some substance, and then divergent points of view require conflict. 
What that suggests is that if we embrace a theory with the compulsoriness 
of consequentialism, we have strong reason to embrace evaluator neu- 
trality as well. In this Section we shall look in more detail at two ways 
in which the conflict required by evaluator relativity is manifested, and 
we shall make some comparisons with evaluator-neutral theories. 
A 
Evaluator-relative theories do not allow agents to give sincere moral ad- 
vice.7 Suppose Jones is in a position to confer a benefit either on his own 
child or on Smith's. Jones asks Smith what he should do. On the theory 
that tells each agent to favor his own child, Jones should confer the benefit 
on his child. But on the same theory Smith ought to advise Jones to confer 
the benefit on Smith's child since giving that advice is the act of Smith's 
that will produce best consequences as Smith is required to evaluate 
them. The theory requires Smith to advise Jones to do something other 
than what (Smith knows) the theory requires Jones to do. 
Two lines of defense of evaluator relativity suggest themselves. On the 
one hand, the defender might say that even an evaluator-neutral con- 
sequence-based theory sometimes requires insincere advice and that the 
problem, if there is one, is connected to the emphasis on consequences, 
rather than to evaluator relativity. For example, even on an evaluator- 
neutral theory, if you ask me for advice and I know you are going to do 
the opposite of what I advise, I may be required to advise you to do the 
act I believe to be wrong in order to bring it about that you do the act I 
believe to be right. Now, whether it is a bad thing that an evaluator- 
neutral theory should require insincere advice in the case just described, 
and if so just how bad a thing it is, are questions that would take us far 
afield. Fortunately, we can see without any divagation that there is an, 
enormous difference between the implications of the evaluator-neutral 
theory and the evaluator-relative one. Under the evaluator-neutral theory, 
even "insincere" advice will always be aimed at leading the recipient of 
7. This point has often been made as a criticism of ethical egoism. E. g., William Frankena, 
Ethics, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 19; Kalin, "In Defense of 
Egoism," pp. 8o-84. 
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the advice to do the right act. The right act is the one that maximizes 
the value of the consequences. Since both giver and receiver of advice 
are required to evaluate consequences in the same way, the right act for 
the person advised is also the act with best consequences as evaluated 
by the adviser. Under the evaluator-relative theory, in contrast, the in- 
sincere (but required) advice will be aimed at leading the recipient of the 
advice to do what he should not. 
The other line of defense of the evaluator-relative theory points out 
that the theory need not be entirely consequence-based. There may be 
special deontological constraints that require sincerity in giving advice 
(perhaps as part of a general deontological requirement of truth telling). 
About this line of defense I have two comments. First, it implicitly con- 
cedes that there is a significant disadvantage in evaluator relativity from 
the point of view of anyone who wants his theory to be entirely conse- 
quence-based. Second, it is unclear just how much consequence-based 
evaluation, even of an evaluator-relative sort, will be left after the im- 
position of enough deontological constraints to solve the present difficulty 
entirely. The difficulty affects much more than the giving of advice. My 
acts may influence yours in innumerable ways. On an evaluator-relative 
theory, whenever I am required to take into account the consequences 
of your acts as indirect consequences of mine, I am likely to have perverse 
incentives. I will want to influence you to produce the consequences 
which are best as I evaluate them. I will therefore often want to influence 
you to an act which will not produce the best consequences as you ought 
to evaluate them-which will, in other words, be the wrong act.8 
B 
A further problem with evaluator-relative theories is that they generate 
situations analogous to the prisoners' dilemma.9 Evaluator-neutral the- 
ories do not. Consider again the theory which instructs Jones and Smith 
each to give special weight to the welfare of his own child. Suppose Jones 
and Smith find themselves in the following position: Jones can either 
confer a benefit on his own child or confer a greater benefit on Smith's 
8. One way of dealing with the problem of this subsection might be to stipulate that 
Smith should value directly Jones's acting rightly. This suggestion seems too gimmicky, 
and if taken seriously would lead to too great complexities, to be worth considering here. 
9. Again, this point is a standard criticism of ethical egoism, since it is egoism that 
generates the classical prisoners' dilemma. See Frankena, Ethics, p. I9. 
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child; Smith can either confer a benefit on his own child or confer a 
greater benefit on Jones's child; Jones and Smith cannot make an effec- 
tive agreement to "trade" benefits for each other's children, and neither 
of them can affect the way the other acts. In this situation, given appro- 
priate further assumptions about the size of the benefits and the degree 
to which each father must favor his own child, the evaluator-relative 
theory will require Jones to benefit Jones's child and Smith to benefit 
Smith's child. The end result will be that each child is worse off than he 
would have been if both parents had followed an evaluator-neutral mo- 
rality and each had conferred the greatest benefit he could on any child, 
regardless of its paternity. When both parents follow the evaluator-relative 
morality, neither achieves his goals as defined by the evaluator-relative 
morality itself as well as he would have if both had followed an evaluator- 
neutral morality.'o 
I have just described a case in which an evaluator-relative morality 
generates a prisoners' dilemma analogue; and I have noted that in this 
case, at least, an evaluator-neutral morality would have saved the day. 
There are other sorts of cases where it is often suggested that evaluator- 
neutral theories generate prisoners' dilemma analogues. It is a common 
argument against act-utilitarianism that it would require that everyone 
refuse to vote, or that everyone cheat on his taxes if he could get away 
with it, even though such behavior, if universal, would have disastrous 
consequences. Now, even if these arguments against act-utilitarianism 
were correct, they would not indicate a problem to which evaluator rel- 
ativity would seem the natural solution. (We could impose a solution, in 
an evaluator-relative form, by altering the objective functions so that each 
agent regards as a significant good his own voting, or whatever. But that 
seems too ad hoc to be relevant.) In any event, the arguments against 
act-utilitarianism are not correct. It is possible that everyone should be- 
have in such a way that each agent satisfies act-utilitarianism, given the 
way the others behave, and disastrous consequences result. But this is 
not yet an analogue of the prisoners' dilemma. In the prisoners' dilemma, 
each agent is required (by self-interest) to behave in a particular way 
regardless of how the others behave, and the results are unsatisfactory 
for all concerned. With regard to act-utilitarianism, I have shown else- 
io. For a full and illuminating discussion, see Derek Parfit, "Prudence, Morality, and 
the Prisoner's Dilemma," Proceedings of the British Academy for 1979 (London: Oxford 
University Press, ig8i). 
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where that it is not possible to describe a situation where every agent is 
required by act-utilitarianism to behave in a certain way regardless of 
how others behave and where disastrous consequences result from all 
agents' behaving as they are required to. Indeed, whatever general pattern 
of behavior produces the best possible consequences, it is always true 
that in that pattern every agent satisfies act-utilitarianism, given the way 
the others are behaving. Evaluator-neutral theories, for which act-utili- 
tarianism is in the present context an adequate representative, cannot 
give rise to prisoners' dilemmas. 
V 
The preceding Section makes it natural to propose the following argu- 
ment: The good (or the good from a point of view) is something one is 
morally required to promote. If it is implausible to suppose that different 
agents are morally required to promote conflicting goods, then it is im- 
plausible to suppose that there are conflicting goods (in the relevant 
sense). It is implausible to suppose that different agents are morally 
required to promote conflicting goods. (That is not to deny, of course, 
that it may be morally appropriate for different agents to focus their 
attention and energies on different persons and projects; but that is a 
much weaker claim.) Therefore, it is implausible to suppose that there 
are conflicting goods of the sort Sen posits. 
This argument actually highlights one of the unsatisfying features of 
the present discussion. Sen suggests that perhaps our notion of the good 
should be evaluator relative. I respond by pointing out the difficulty of 
understanding Sen's suggestion and also by pointing out various respects 
in which an evaluator-relative good would be unable to play the role in 
moral theory that an evaluator-neutral good has traditionally played. A 
third party might well break in: "Enough of this indirection. Instead of 
arguing about what the good might look like, tell us what it does look 
like, and give us some arguments. Then we will know whether it is neutral 
or relative." The point is that any consequentialist, whether neutralist or 
i i. Donald H. Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ig8o), 
pp. 54-65. Elsewhere in the same book I describe a theory, called cooperative utilitarianism, 
which is superior to act-utilitarianism in respects relevant to the present discussion; but 
even to describe precisely the advantages of cooperative utilitarianism would require a 
digression of unjustifiable length. 
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relativist, ought ideally to produce some account of why the things he 
says are good are so. Notoriously, no one has yet done an entirely satis- 
factory job at this. But if someone could produce an adequate substantive 
account of the good, then it seems the issues dealt with in this essay 
would resolve themselves. 
That observation leads to another. If we ask what is appealing in the 
idea of evaluator relativity, aside from the logical interest of a new struc- 
tural possibility, the answer may be this: one may be inclined to a relativist 
view by the suspicion that any argument that could explain why there 
is any objective value would at the same time explain why there are 
different, equally objective, evaluative points of view. I do not share this 
suspicion, and I shall not argue against it here; but it provides yet another 
reason for admitting that the arguments for neutralism in this essay are 
not ultimately satisfying by themselves. On behalf of either neutralism 
or relativism, some more direct demonstration would be in order. 
VI 
I lean toward consequentialism in ethics, and I have discussed evaluator 
relativity primarily from the consequentialist's point of view. However, 
Sen's evaluator-relative theories are designed to capture in a conse- 
quence-based format essentially deontological intuitions. Would a pos- 
sessor of basically deontological intuitions find Sen's new idea more at- 
tractive than I do? Probably not, for two reasons. 
First, even where an evaluator-relative theory generates the right pre- 
scriptions for action, it could be thought to misdescribe the reasons.'2 
The idea that parents should promote the interests of their own children 
is very common. But not many people who promote the interests of their 
own children would say they did so because a benefit for their child was 
a greater good than the same benefit for someone else's child. They would 
not even say it was a greater good from some point of view peculiar to 
(but appropriate to) themselves. They would admit that a benefit for their 
neighbor's child was every bit as good as a benefit for their own, and they 
would then benefit their own if they could, feeling perfectly entitled 
morally to this behavior. (It is perhaps worth mentioning that a doer- 
relative but evaluator-neutral theory would not capture the common in- 
I 2. I believe I owe this point to Derek Parfit. 
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tuition either. Ordinary people who favor their own children are not in- 
different between conferring a benefit on their own child and bringing 
it about that a neighbor confers a comparable benefit on his child.) 
Second, nothing one could reasonably call a consequence-based theory 
is going to capture all the distinctions that matter to the deontological 
mind. Deontologists are too concerned about the way consequences are 
produced. In terms of the consequences, there is no difference between 
Jones's rescuing his son instead of Smith's son from a burning building 
and Jones's persuading the fire brigade (if they alone can effect a rescue) 
to do the same. But many people would see a difference here. Similarly, 
many people would believe that even if I need not forgo a large benefit 
in order to stop you from twisting a child's arm, still I may not permit 
you to twist the child's arm in order to produce an identical benefit.'3 
The difference, whatever it is, is not in the consequences. 
I3. See Thomas Nagel, "The Limits of Objectivity," in The Tanner Lectures on Human 
Values I, ed. Sterling McMurrin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ig8o), p. I30. 
I have learned much about the topic of this essay from conversations with Amartya Sen 
and from the other members of a discussion group in Oxford to whom he and I read earlier 
versions of our papers. 
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